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‘DEPOLITICIZING’ THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD: ADMINISTRATIVE STEPS
Samuel Estreicher∗
ABSTRACT
Complaints about the political forces arrayed against the basic labor laws
and about the increasing “politicization” of the National Labor Relations
Board are hardy perennials. The charge remains a constant, only those who
level it differ depending on which party is in the White House. On the
assumption that legislative change is not in the offing, what can the Board on
its own do to improve its reputation in Congress and in the courts and, at the
same time, enhance its effectiveness as the essential government agency to
protect workers in dealings with their employers?
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INTRODUCTION
I am using inverted commas in my title to assure the reader that I am not a
naïve academic or, worse, a dithering idiot. The National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB or Board) is the agency entrusted by Congress to enforce the
National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA or Act). Politics have been an
inescapable part of labor law. This has been the case from the day the NLRA
was enacted, marking, as it did, the first significant government intrusion into
private employer decisionmaking. It remains so to this day—reflecting
ever-contested terrain between employees and their representatives and
management. Although there are many areas for shared gains between labor
and management, generally when the Board gets involved employees are
seeking to organize a union or compel management to bargain with the union.
At least in the short term, a win for employees or the union is a loss for
management, and vice versa.
The Board, if it is doing its best to enforce its organic statute, will often be
viewed by disappointed parties and their allies as “political” and by winning
parties and their supporters as “effective” guardians of the law. Congress, on
some level, intended a continuation of the political process within the NLRB1
by establishing a multimember “independent” agency with the custom2 of the
President appointing three members from his political party and two from the
opposition party, rather than relying on the courts for enforcement.
The charge of politicization contains a kernel of truth but is nearly always
an overstatement. The members of the Board and the General Counsel, the
other presidential appointee, are conscientious professionals aware of their
distinct obligations in serving a public agency. Most cases involve relatively
fact-specific applications of the Act by administrative law judges; these rulings
stir little controversy and are summarily affirmed by three-member panels of
the agency without dissent (and routinely enforced by the courts of appeals). It
is with respect to a relatively small number of cases and certain agency
initiatives, such as the promulgation of national rules, where the law is either
unclear or reversal of the agency law is being sought, and where Board
members are likely to be especially responsive to their pre-NLRB political or
1 See Samuel Estreicher, Policy Oscillation at the Labor Board: A Plea for Rulemaking, 37 ADMIN. L.
REV. 163 (1985); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Judicial Review of Agency Decisions: The Labor Board and the Court,
1968 SUP. CT. REV. 53.
2 See Ronald Turner, Ideological Voting on the National Labor Relations Board, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 707, 709–11, 714–15 (2006).
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ideological inclinations.3 It is this relatively narrow, yet important, sphere of
the agency’s work that triggers the politicization charge.
It is difficult to say whether the Board is more political now than it was
during, say, the Reagan administration (when the agency triggered a great deal
of such criticism).4 Today, the charge is leveled by Republicans and employer
representatives; then, the charge was leveled by Democrats and union
representatives. There is reason to believe, however, that whatever the
underlying factual reality may be, the charge now poses a greater threat to the
NLRB’s future viability than it has in the past.
The perception of a “politicized” agency seems stronger than ever. This is
due to many causes, several of which are beyond the Board’s control or
influence. One is the widening polarization of the political parties; there are
very few, if any, Republican Senators or Representatives that, as a general
matter, support the NLRA. NLRA adherents among their ranks have for some
time been a dying species and are now, for all practical purposes, extinct.
Alongside that development, and perhaps abetting it, is the almost complete
alignment of organized labor with the fortunes of one political party, the
Democrats.
A second factor is that most employers have no real stake in a vigorously
enforced NLRA. Dealing with a union is a little bit like being struck by
lightning. An increasingly small number of private employers have
union-represented employees or realistically expect organizing drives in their
future. Few such employers are clamoring for unionization to be extended to
their competitors. Those affected by unionization efforts are intensely
interested in stymieing the agency and are able, with the acquiescence of other
companies, to urge the various trade associations to take a hard line in
Congress and the courts against the Board.
As for labor unions, they, too, have a much weaker stake in the NLRA.
Union unfair labor practices, introduced by the 1947 amendments to the Act,

3 Some members on occasion vote in politically unpredictable ways. See Joan Flynn, A Quiet Revolution
at the Labor Board: The Transformation of the NLRB, 1935–2000, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361, 1367–68 & 1408
tbl.2 (2000); Paul M. Secunda, Politics Not as Usual: Inherently Destructive Conduct, Institutional
Collegiality, and the National Labor Relations Board, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 51, 102–05 (2004).
4 The movement away from appointing career government types to the Board is said to have begun with
the Eisenhower administration and accelerated during the Reagan years. See James J. Brudney, Isolated and
Politicized: The NLRB’s Uncertain Future, 26 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 221 (2005); Flynn, supra note 3, at
1367–77.
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are few in number because unions are less involved in traditional organizing
campaigns involving labor picketing; preliminary injunctions against union
violations these days are virtually unheard of. Instead, where organizing is
occurring, unions tend to employ variants of the “corporate campaign”
technique to wrest “neutrality and card check” agreements from target
employers, thus bypassing NLRA processes altogether. If the unions have any
interest in the Board, it is in enlisting the agency’s occasional assistance during
bitterly fought collective bargaining disputes with employers or in advancing
novel theories of employer responsibility to facilitate organizing.
One consequence of these factors is the impact on the pool of people that
might be attracted to serve on the Board and how the Board’s work product is
regarded by judges and other decisionmakers. Today, few in the labor and
employee relations community, whether they are practitioners, academics, or
even professional neutrals,5 likely to be considered for an appointment to the
agency come without firmly established views on most of the issues in
contention. These professionals take their job seriously and are open to the
evidence and reasoned argument. But in the hard, politically tinged cases, they
are not likely to depart from their prior conceptions. The decisions that issue in
these hard cases are invariably seen, not entirely without cause, by the losing
side as a product of political or ideological preferences.
Another consequence is that Board innovation increasingly incites
enormous, cascading controversy. When the Board ventures into new areas
where the NLRA has not previously been applied (not in itself problematic)—
for example, considering “employee” status for college football players or
adjunct faculty, or challenging “class action waiver” agreements in the
nonunion sector as an interference with employee concerted activity—fuel is
added to the fire. For the Board’s opponents in Congress and among allied
trade associations, the choice is clear and unwavering: stop the agency in its
tracks.
Does the Board’s reputation affect its record in the courts? There is no
discernible effect with respect to the routine, fact-specific cases that are grist
for the NLRA mill. If there is an effect, it is in hard-fought cases in the courts
of appeals—especially, the District of Columbia Circuit, where the alternative

5 There are relatively few professional neutrals in the labor relations sphere who are “acceptable” to
both unions and employers. Of these, it is doubtful any would leave a lucrative arbitration practice to serve on
the Board, where one’s public voting record could complicate post-NLRB engagements.
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venue provision steers many Board orders for review. And it is with regard to
the agency’s rulemaking efforts.
It may be that the time has come for a legislative fix, for a fundamental
alteration of the statutory scheme. Republican Senators Lamar Alexander and
Mitch McConnell have authored a bill that would expand the agency to six
members, require that any decision receive the support of four members to be
valid, and provide for immediate judicial review of NLRB General Counsel
complaints.6 Professor Zev Eigen of Northwestern University School of Law
and Sandro Garofalo of the Target Corporation have proposed transferring all
adjudication of unfair labor practice complaints to the federal courts with the
NLRB limited to holding elections and ruling on election objections.7 On
February 23, 2015, fifty-two Republican senators approved a joint resolution,
which soon thereafter passed the House in a largely partisan vote, disapproving
of the NLRB regulation dealing with representation case procedure8 and
declaring that “such rule shall have no force or effect.”9 Predictably, President
Obama vetoed the measure; an override has not been attempted.
If past experience is any guide, these legislative seeds are not likely to bear
fruit any time soon. It is very difficult to change laws under our federal system,
and the NLRA, like Social Security, may be one of the “third rails” of U.S.
politics.10
But these stirrings should help us bear in mind the political winds that
could fundamentally change the NLRA. Should anyone care? In my view, the
state of the agency should be a concern not just to its personnel but to those
who support the essential guarantees of the Act—that employees should be
free of employer retaliation to engage in concerted activity for their mutual aid
or protection and to select collective bargaining agents. A vibrant Board is
needed not so much for the high-visibility, controversial cases but for the
6 See Press Release, Lamar Alexander, Alexander Introduces “NLRB Reform Act” to Change the
National Labor Relations Board from an Advocate to an Umpire (Sept. 16, 2014), available at
http://www.alexander.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ID=67fce1d6-ff3e-4d60-9d26-fe90444aba55.
7 See Zev J. Eigen & Sandro Garofalo, Less Is More: A Case for Structural Reform of the National
Labor Relations Board, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1879 (2014).
8 Representation—Case Procedures, 79 Fed. Reg. 74,308 (Dec. 15, 2014) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt.
101–103).
9 See S.J. Res. 8, 114th Cong. (vetoed Mar. 31, 2015); 161 CONG. REC. H1782–88 (daily ed. Mar 19,
2015); see also Memorandum of Disapproval Regarding Legislation Concerning the National Labor Relations
Board Rule on Representation Case Procedures, 2015 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 216 (Mar. 31, 2015).
10 The merits of these proposals is not the focus of this paper. The Eigen-Garafalo article does warrant
further consideration.
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everyday holding of prompt elections, investigation of retaliatory discharge
charges, and repair to the district courts for a preliminary injunction to reinstate
workers discharged in the course of an organizing drive. If the Board’s overall
reputation suffers, or if Congress deprives the Board of its adjudicatory
function, the only resort for workers will be litigation in the courts where,
unless they are supported by a union, they will have to fend for themselves
without counsel; and, moreover, the law will confusingly, and perhaps
incoherently, develop district-by-district and lawsuit-by-lawsuit.
But there is a problem, at least in perception, and the Board should be open
to improvements in how it conducts its business. I have a few suggestions,
none of which require a statutory amendment, that I hope the Board and its
General Counsel will consider. The underlying objectives behind these
suggestions are (1) furthering the relative stability of Board law, (2) improving
the quality of Board decisions by expanding the sources of information
available to the agency, and (3) husbanding the political capital of the agency
through prudential rules of abstention for disputes between parties in
established collective-bargaining relationships.
I. FURTHERING THE RELATIVE STABILITY OF BOARD LAW
A. Rule of Four for All Policy Reversals
By internal agreement, the members of Board would bind themselves, at
least on an annual basis, to a Rule of Four: all cases coming to them
contemplating or requiring a reversal of a prior NLRB decision would be heard
by all five members and would require a vote of at least four members to take
effect.11 I have previously argued for rulemaking for policy reversals.12 The
proposal offered here does not require rulemaking. It would send a message to
all affected by the Board’s work that the agency’s general policy is to preserve
the stability of Board law, that policy reversals will be more exceptional than
has been the case, and that some bipartisan support will be required to overturn
a prior decision.13

11

This is similar in form to the “Rule of Three” the Board now follows for policy reversals.
See Estreicher, supra note 1.
13 An alternative to the Rule of Four would be for the Board to agree to publish annually an Agenda of
Issues of Board Law for Reconsideration, inviting commentary focused on particular issues, and then limit all
policy reversals to issues that appear on that list, with perhaps an exception for issues arising in the course of
adjudication that require a policy reversal and which four members are willing to vote for reversal.
12
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B. Statement of Special Justification for Policy Reversals
Again, by internal agreement, the Board would require that any decision to
overrule a prior decision spell out what new evidence has come to light or what
changed circumstances have occurred justifying such an overruling. A mere
change in the composition of the Board or a judgment that the first decision
was simply wrong would not be a sufficient justification.14 This is in line with
the Supreme Court’s recent teaching in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.15:
To be sure, the requirement that an agency provide reasoned
explanation for its action would ordinarily demand that it display
awareness that it is changing position. An agency may not, for
example, depart from a prior policy sub silentio or simply disregard
rules that are still on the books. And of course the agency must show
that there are good reasons for the new policy. But it need not
demonstrate to a court’s satisfaction that the reasons for the new
policy are better than the reasons for the old one; it suffices that the
new policy is permissible under the statute, that there are good
reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to be better, which the
conscious change of course adequately indicates. This means that the
agency need not always provide a more detailed justification than
what would suffice for a new policy created on a blank slate.
Sometimes it must—when, for example, its new policy rests upon
factual findings that contradict those which underlay its prior policy;
or when its prior policy has engendered serious reliance interests that
must be taken into account. It would be arbitrary or capricious to
ignore such matters. In such cases it is not that further justification is
demanded by the mere fact of policy change; but that a reasoned
explanation is needed for disregarding facts and circumstances that
underlay or were engendered by the prior policy.16

II. IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF BOARD DECISIONMAKING BY ENHANCING
THE RANGE OF INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE AGENCY
Despite the initial success of healthcare-bargaining unit rulemaking in the
1980s,17 and the Supreme Court’s unanimous endorsement of the agency’s
14 This statement-of-justification requirement would generally be enforced by the Members themselves
informing how they vote on the proposed policy reversal. There may be cases where failure to provide such a
justification may affect judicial review of the Board’s order.
15 556 U.S. 502 (2009).
16 Id. at 515–16 (citations omitted).
17 For an extensive overview of the Board’s first substantive rulemaking, see Mark H. Grunewald, The
NLRB’s First Rulemaking: An Exercise in Pragmatism, 41 DUKE L.J. 274 (1991).
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authority to engage in legislative rulemaking,18 the Board is wary of further
rulemaking initiatives. Three setbacks have led to this attitude: the legislative
reaction to the single-location bargaining unit initiative during the Clinton
administration,19 the rejection by two courts of appeals of the agency’s
notice-posting rule,20 and the still uncertain future of its representation-case
procedure rulemaking. This record may encourage the agency to re-embrace
case-by-case adjudication as the less visible, less politically charged route for
new policymaking.21
The Board, in my view, should not abandon rulemaking but learn from
experience and craft rules that do a better job of accommodating conflicting
interests. The substantive objections of the courts should be taken into account.
For example, to deal with the District of Columbia Circuit’s criticism that the
Board’s notice-posting rule22 impermissibly infringed on the right of
employers to be free from “compelled speech,” the Board could relaunch a
notice-posting rule that leaves out the fact-pattern illustrations and newfound,
debatable remedial provisions in the rejected rule. It would then make the case
that the Board has the requisite statutory authority and that there are no serious
Section 8(c) difficulties with such a stripped-down notice posting.
There can be other situations where the Board might use a
notice-and-comment procedure where the end result is not a rule but
information that helps the Board consider important regulatory questions. I
have suggested in previous writings23 that the Board has authority, under an
extension of the reasoning in Excelsior Underwear Inc.,24 after a representation
election has been scheduled to afford the petitioning labor organization access,
with appropriate security measures, to certain nonworking areas of the
18

Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606 (1991).
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Appropriateness of Requested Single Location Bargaining Units in
Representation Cases, 60 Fed. Reg. 50,146 (Sept. 28, 1995), withdrawn, 63 Fed. Reg. 8890 (Feb. 23, 1998).
20 See Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. NLRB, 721 F.3d 152 (4th Cir. 2013); Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v.
NLRB, 717 F.3d 947 (D.C. Cir. 2013), overruled in part on other grounds by Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (overruling discussion of scope of Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985)).
21 See Joan Flynn, The Costs and Benefits of “Hiding the Ball”: NLRB Policymaking and the Failure of
Judicial Review, 75 B.U. L. REV. 387 (1995).
22 Notification of Employee Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 54,006 (Aug.
30, 2011).
23 See Samuel Estreicher, “Easy In, East Out”: A Future for U.S. Workplace Representation, 98 MINN.
L. REV. 1615, 1632–33 (2014); Samuel Estreicher, Improving the Administration of the National Labor
Relations Act Without Statutory Change, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1 (2009).
24 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1239–40 (1966).
19
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employer’s facility, such as the break room and cafeteria, to discuss with
employees the merits of voting for the union in the upcoming election. The
statutory goal of an informed employee electorate would be advanced by such
limited mandatory access. A notice-and-comment proceeding could be used to
test reactions among practitioners and to learn in-depth the practical, logistical
issues that bear on the question before the Board. Equipped with such
information, whether the Board addresses the issue in adjudication or
rulemaking, its decision is likely to be a better decision on the merits and is
more likely to receive a favorable review in the courts.
Thought also should be given to revisiting the Gould Board’s use of
advisory committees of labor and management representatives. Such
committees need not represent merely one side but could instead be “mixed”
committees of labor, management, and academics.25
III. HUSBANDING THE POLITICAL CAPITAL OF THE AGENCY THROUGH
PRUDENTIAL RULES OF DEFERRAL/ABSTENTION FOR DISPUTES INVOLVING
ESTABLISHED COLLECTIVE BARGAINING RELATIONSHIP
This is a proposal for a broadening of Collyer-type26 deferral to arbitration:
If the parties are in an established collective bargaining relationship and there
is a good reason to believe that the parties’ dispute, even if nominally over a
statutory question, is capable of being resolved in the parties’ agreed-upon
arbitration process, the Board should stay its hand, reserving its jurisdiction for
possible review of any award at the conclusion of the arbitration process. Thus,
for example, a union’s unfair labor practice charge against a company
considering the transfer of unit work to another location should be deferred to
arbitration to determine whether the company has contractual authority to
transfer the work. Theoretically, resolution of the contractual issue via
arbitration may not fully resolve the statutory question, whether it is a claimed
failure to bargain in good faith or a claimed discriminatory work relocation,

25 The Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972) (codified at 5 U.S.C. app.
§§ 1–16 (2012)), sets up hurdles to creating such advisory committees, but they are not insurmountable. The
Board should also consider using the procedures of the Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561–570a
(2012), for certain recurring issues.
26 See Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
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but arbitration is likely to resolve many of the underlying factual issues and, as
a practical matter, encourage the parties to resolve the underlying dispute.27
This proposal would only apply to disputes where resolution of the
contractual issue would be helpful. It would not apply to questions of
individual employee rights independent of the duty-to-bargain
rights/prerogatives of the bargaining representative.
Perhaps the Board could convene an advisory committee or negotiated
rulemaking committee to consider possible extension of this Collyer approach
to other disputes involving established bargaining relationships.
The basic idea here is that disputes in an established relationship are best
left for the parties to resolve on their own and, at the end of the day, the Board
will not and should not change the outcome of the bargaining. Additionally,
the theoretical existence of a statutory question is not a good enough reason for
the Board to get involved when there is reason to believe that the parties’
agreed-upon arbitration process can resolve the dispute or is otherwise worth
pursuing.
CONCLUSION
These are a few ideas to provoke discussion of ways the Board can improve
its general reputation in Congress and the courts without compromising its core
statutory responsibilities.

27 This proposal is in some tension with the Board’s recent 3–2 ruling in Babcock & Wilcox Constr. Co.,
361 N.L.R.B. No. 132, 2014 WL 7149039 (Dec. 15, 2014), which tightens up post-arbitral review by the
agency but does not appear to change pre-arbitral deferral under Collyer and its progeny.

